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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
James A. Johnson and 
Jennifer L. Johnson, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
Nielsen & Senior, a Utah 
Corporation, and Pat B. Brian, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
I. JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a dismissal by the Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, State of Utah of Appellant's action. The 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2-2. The Supreme Court have poured this case over 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the court abused it discretion when it 
dismissed this action for failure to prosecute. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the 
business of the court with efficiency and expedition, the 
trial court should have a reasonable latitude of 
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a 
party fails to move forward according to the rules and 
the direction of the court, without justifiable excuse. 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen 
Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
Case No. 930340 
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2. Whether the trial court improperly dismissed 
plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress as a measure of 
damages with regard to causes of action for legal malpractice by 
defendants. 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW: 
A trial court's statements or conclusions of law 
are accorded no particular deference; we review 
them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 
1176,1179 (Utah 1989). 
3. Whether the trial court was without jurisdiction to 
dismiss while a request for Interlocutory Order was before the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW: 
A trial court's statements or conclusions of law 
are accorded no particular deference; we review 
them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 
1176,1179 (Utah 1989). 
If there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, 
the motion should be denied. Young v. Filerenia, 121 Utah 
646 244 P.2d 862 Cert, denied 344 U.S. 886 73 S.Ct. 186 
97 L.Ed 685 (1952). 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Constitution Article I Section 11: 
All courts shall be open,and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
ahve remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
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Utah Constitution Article VIII Section 2: 
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall 
consist of at least five justices. The number of justices 
may be changed by statute, but no change shall have the 
effect of removing a justice from office. A chief justice 
shall be selected from among the justices of the Supreme 
Court as provided by statute. The chief justice may 
resign as chief justice without resigning from the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by rule may sit and 
render final judgment either en banc or in divisions. The 
court shall not declare nay law unconstitutional under 
this constitution or the Constitution of the United 
States, except on the occurrence of a majority of all 
justices of the Supreme Court. If a justice of the 
Supreme Court is disqualified or otherwise unable to 
participate in a cause before the court, the chief 
justice, or in the event the chid justice is disqualified 
or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall 
call an active judge from an appellate court or the 
district court to participate in the case. 
Utah Constitution Article VIII Section 3: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. The 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all 
other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and 
power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the 
exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the 
complete determination any cause. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b): 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply 
with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against 
him. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c): 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any of material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
This case is an appeal from a dismissal with prejudice for 
failure to prosecute by the trial court and a summary judgment 
dismissing claims for emotional distress damages. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. On October 5, 1992, 
former counsel for plaintiffs moved to withdraw since no trial date 
had been set in the matter. R at 1737. On October 26, 1992, R at 
1756, and again on December 23, 1992, R at 1782(a), present counsel 
appeared due to confusion as to whether withdrawal of former 
counsel had been accepted by the court. 
The court accepted the Motion to Withdraw of former counsel by 
Order filed January 15, 1993, (R at 1785). 
Defendants immediately moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
Complaint for failure to prosecute on February 3, 1993, (R at 1802 
and 1804). 
Plaintiff opposed this motion by Memorandum filed February 19, 
1993, (R at 1812). Defendants replied by Memorandum file March 1, 
1993, (R at 1858). Judgment for Dismissal was granted March 11, 
1993 and entered April 6, 1993, (R at 1879). Motion for New Trial 
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was filed April 16, 1993, (R at 1895). Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for New Trial was opposed by defendants by Memorandum filed 
May 3, 1993 (R at 1928). Reply Memorandum was filed by plaintiffs 
May 13, 1993, (R at 2101). The court issued a Memorandum Decision 
filed May 26, 1993 denying Motion for New Trial, (R at 2119). An 
Order Denying Motion for New Trial was filed June 16, 1993 by the 
Court, (R at 2167). Notice of Appeal was filed in this matter by 
plaintiffs on June 25, 1993, R at (2177). 
2. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
DAMAGES. Defendants sought to dismiss all claims with regard to 
infliction of emotional distress and all damages of a like nature 
arising under other claims of plaintiffs. A Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the matter was filed November 8, 1991, R at 
1060. The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was opposed by 
plaintiffs by Memorandum filed December 2, 1991, (R at 1110). 
Defendant Pat B. Brian joined in the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment by Motion filed December 9, 1991, (R at 1124), and Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment filed December 9, 1992, (R at 1130). 
A Reply Memorandum was filed by defendant Nielsen & Senior December 
11, 1991, (R at 1147). Defendant Nielsen & Senior supported 
Defendant Pat B. Brian's Motion by Memorandum filed December 30, 
1991, (R at 1165). 
Plaintiffs opposed, by memorandum, Defendant Pat B. Brian's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 6, 1992, (R at 
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1242). Partial Summary Judgment was granted by Order filed January 
23, 1992, (R at 1371) . 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW 
This matter arose out of professional malpractice committed by 
defendant Pat B. Brian. In January of 1986, Plaintiffs hired 
Defendant Pat B. Brian to take care of all legal requirements with 
regard to a private placement adoption, (R at 1876). The baby was 
born on or about June 25, 1986 in Texas, (R at 10). 
On or about June 27, 1986, Defendant Brian brought the baby 
from Texas to Salt Lake International Airport, but failed in any 
way to comply with the provisions of the Interstate Compact for the 
Placement of Children in any way shape or form, (R at 1875). 
No consent to adopt or termination or parental rights was 
executed by the birth mother at any time when dealing with 
Defendants Brian and Nielsen & Senior. 
On or about June 24, 1987, Chris Schmutz, successor counsel to 
Defendant Brian, informed plaintiffs that the birth mother was 
seeking to regain custody of the child, (R at 10). Following the 
retaining of different law firm on July 2, 1987, a termination of 
parental rights was agreed to with the birth mother and the 
adoption finalized on October 16, 1987, (R at 1875). 
Between October 16, 1987 and the date of the filing of the 
petition in June of 1990, plaintiffs attempted to negotiate a 
settlement with defendants, (R at 1874). 
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Because defendant Brian was a sitting judge, (R at 1875), 
plaintiffs have had difficulty in retaining counsel, and filed the 
original complaint pro se, (R at 12). 
Plaintiff James A. Johnson originally had depositions set for 
November 6, 1990, but such deposition was rescheduled until 
November 28, 1990, (R at 192 and 232). Plaintiff was subjected to 
such intense stress from the deposition over a three (3) day period 
of time that the stress he relapsed into the depression he is 
suffering from as a result of the original adoption. This caused 
him to be unable to continue the deposition, (R at 412) (letter 
from treating physician, Ralph W. Gant). 
Mr. Johnson's depression was a direct result of Post-traumatic 
Stress Disorde* which he suffered as a result of the malpractice of 
defendants, (R at 1177). 
Defendant Brian originally had a deposition set for October 
27, 1990, (R at 1901). Defendant Brian changed and rescheduled his 
deposition for November 30, 1990, (R at 229). Defendant Brian 
finally had his deposition actually taken, November 30, 1993, (R at 
1225), more than one year from the original date scheduled. 
Defendant Brian's extension and rescheduling was not due to the 
unavailability of the plaintiffs nor their counsel. 
The continuance of Mr. Johnson's deposition following the 
appearance of Darwin Fisher in this matter on April 16, 1991, (R at 
867), was entirely due to the procrastination of defendants, (R at 
1901). 
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The continuance and delay with regard to Defendant Brian's 
deposition was due to his request for delay, R at 1901. 
It was not until October 17, 1991, that Defendant Brian 
proposed a Counterclaim in this matter, sixteen (16) months after 
initiation of the action and after trial had been set for February 
17-28, 1992, (R at 897). 
On January 17, 1992, one (1) month prior to trial, the trial 
court granted leave to Defendant Brian's to file his Counterclaim 
(R at 1729). Counterclaim was filed by Defendant Brian on February 
4, 1992, (R at 1484). Because of Defendant Brian's tardy filing of 
a Counterclaim, new trial was set by the court for May of 1992, (R 
at 1490). 
At the same time that the Counterclaim for Defendant Brian was 
allowed, partial summary judgment was granted with regard to 
emotional distress damages of plaintiffs by the court, denying the 
same, (R at 1371). This order was filed January 23, 1992. 
Based upon the denial of a major portion of plaintiffs' claim 
for damages, those due to the emotional distress suffered by 
plaintiffs, (R at 1177), plaintiffs requested an interlocutory 
opinion by the Utah Supreme Court on April 7, 1992, (R at 1645). 
The trial court continued the trial without date by Order entered 
April 7, 1992, (R at 1647). No trial date was set thereafter by the 
court, (R at 1737), although the impression of the parties was that 
the court was to set a date in November, (R at 1745 and 1899). 
No response to the Motion for Interlocutory Order was ever 
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entered by the Utah Supreme Court in this matter prior to the 
dismissal of this case with prejudice. 
Defendants, as well as plaintiffs, have both been compelled by 
the court to respond to discovery, (R at 859 and 863). In addition, 
defendants expert witnesses have been unavailable prior to the end 
of scheduled discovery, (R at 1547, 1657 and 1666). For this 
reason, the court granted an Order Extending Discovery (R at 1584 
and 1687) . 
In addition, defendant Nielsen & Senior sought protective 
orders which the court denied, (R at 1700). 
Finally, Defendant Brian was extremely uncooperative with 
regard to response to Request for Production of Documents, his 
refusal being found to without substance (R at 530 and 555). It was 
this meretricious conduct that caused the court to compel Defendant 
Brian to respond to discovery, (R at 859). 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WAS IMPROPER 
Although trial courts have discretion with regard to the 
control of their calendar, it is an abuse of discretion to deprive 
a party of its right to an adjudication except in the most 
egregious circumstances. Although the trial court followed the 
format for dismissal as set forth in the cases of this court, it 
intentionally ignored significant facts which are undisputed on the 
record in reaching its conclusion to granting dismissal. Both 
parties have acted in a manner that delayed the proceedings and 
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both parties have also moved the case along with a view to judicial 
economy and a resolution of all questions before the court. The 
trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute unfairly punishes 
plaintiffs in this matter and ignores defendant actions. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO DISMISS 
The trial court is an inferior court to the Utah Supreme 
Court. A Motion for Interlocutory Order was before the Supreme 
Court, (R at 1745) when the order to dismiss was entered, (R at 
1879). Because the district court is an inferior court to the 
Supreme Court of Utah, it is without jurisdiction to divest the 
Utah Supreme Court of jurisdiction over a question before it, and 
is obligated to wait until the Utah Supreme Court returns 
jurisdiction before continuing to act. 
C. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES ARE PROPER. 
For almost forty (40) years the law in Utah has recognized 
damages for emotional distress when the conduct of a party is 
outrageous and he either intended to cause emotional distress, or 
acted with reckless disregard of the facts. Defendant Brian 
violated the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children when 
he brought Baby Johnson to Utah. He has provided no information of 
mitigation of his actions. He also failed for over one (1) year to 
achieve a consent to terminate parental rights from the birth 
mother. It is a question of fact as to whether or not his conduct 
was outrageous under the circumstances. There is no doubt that it 
is well recognized generally in society that family bond between 
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natural parents as well as adoptive parents is highly emotional in 
nature and the disruption of that bond, or the threatening of that 
relationship will result in an extremely high degree of emotional 
distress on the part of the party so threatened. Defendant Brian 
acted either with intent or reckless disregard of the facts when he 
failed to comply with statutes which protect the rights of both 
natrual parents and adoptive parents with regard to their legal 
relationships to the child and each other. The court therefore 
acted improperly in as much as a genuine issue of material fact 
existed, and the Utah Supreme Court has recognized a cause of 
action for this type of activity for over forty (40) years. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. DISMISSAL WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the 
business of the court with efficiency and expedition, the 
trial court should have a reasonable latitude of 
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a 
party fails to move forward according to the rules and 
the direction of the court, without justifiable excuse. 
Westinqhouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen 
Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
Plaintiffs brought a motion for new trial following dismissal 
with prejudice for failure to prosecute, (R at 1448). Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in material part as 
follows: 
[A] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
on all or part of the issues, for any of the following 
causes...(1) irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court 
or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
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Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure grants the trial 
court discretion to dismiss actions for failure to prosecute and 
provides in material part as follows: 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure 
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these 
rules or any order of the court, defendant may move for 
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. 
In Westinqhouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen 
Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) the court held that: 
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the 
business of the court with efficiency and expedition, the 
trial courts should have a reasonable latitude of 
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a 
party fails to move forward according to the rules and 
the direction of the court, without justifiable excuse. 
Westinghouse Electric, 544 P.2d at 878-879. 
Therefore, this court reviews with deference orders to dismiss 
for failure to prosecute. However, when that discretion is abused, 
no hesitation should be exercised in setting aside an improper 
dismissal. 
In addition, the dismissal must be reviewed with all 
inferences in a light most to the plaintiff. Martin v. Stevens, 121 
Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (1952). 
B. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE VIOLATED THE OPEN 
COURTS PROVISION 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW: 
A trial court's statements or conclusions of law 
are accorded no particular deference; we review 
them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 
1176,1179 (Utah 1989). 
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This Court and the Utah Supreme Court has had numerous 
opportunities to review dismissals with prejudice for failure to 
prosecute. One reason that the discretion to dismiss is limited by 
Section 11 of Article I (the Open Court's Provision) of the Utah 
Constitution which provides as follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Section 11 has been used to overturn limitations on actions; 
(Berry Ex Rel . Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corporation, 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1986); Sun Valley Waterbeds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & 
Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989); Horton v. Gold Miner's Daughter, 785 
P. 2d 1087 (Utah 1989)), prevent unnecessary bars to action such as 
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. See (Stoker v. Stoker, 
616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980)), and prevent ambiguous waivers of rights 
to appeal to court. (Brackin v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 251 P.16 
(1926)). 
It is this constitutional right to adjudication of rights in 
open court which has undoubtedly been behind the distaste that the 
appellate courts have traditionally shown for motions for dismissal 
for failure to prosecute. In Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 
1368 (Utah 1977), four (4) years was found to insufficient time for 
a case to be before the court to support a motion for dismissal 
with prejudice. The court also found that a sixteen month lapse, 
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during which settlement negotiations were ongoing, was insufficient 
to support dismissal in Utah Oil Company v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1977). Where counsel for plaintiff did not appear for a 
hearing to set a trial, (but was ready willing and able to go 
forward therewith), a six month lack of activity was found 
insufficient in Polke v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977) to 
support dismissal. Finally, the court in Crystal Lime & Cement 
Company v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959), the court 
held that where either party could have gone forward, but both 
chose to dally, that it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute. 
It is therefore only upon the most telling signs of failure to 
prosecute, and an unequivocal showing of clean hands by the moving 
party, that a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute should be 
granted. 
C. THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT A WESTINGHOUSE DISMISSAL 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW: 
A trial court's statements or conclusions of law 
are accorded no particular deference; we review 
them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 
1176,1179 (Utah 1989). 
If there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, 
the motion should be denied. Young v. Filerenia, 121 Utah 
646 244 P.2d 862 Cert, denied 344 U.S. 886 73 S.Ct. 186 
97 L.Ed 685 (1952). 
The court, in Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. 
Larsen Constructions, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) identified 
several factors to be considered by a court considering dismissal. 
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In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Ut App. 1989), the court 
formulated those factors as follows: (1) lapse of time; (2) conduct 
of the parties; (3) opportunity to move the case forward; (4) 
actions of the parties to do so; (5) difficulty and prejudice of 
the parties; and (6) injustice which may result from dismissal. 
(1) LAPSE OF TIME. This case was filed two and one-half years 
prior to motion to dismiss (R at 12 and 1802). Discovery had been 
completed except for defendant's deposition of Mrs. Johnson which 
they failed to reschedule. In fact, they showed no interest therein 
once Mr. Johnson's deposition had been completed, (R at 1898). The 
request for her deposition track with those of her husband, and 
none was scheduled following the completion of his deposition, (R 
at 192, 198, 230, 232, 889 and 943). At the time of dismissal, the 
case was ready for trial, with the exception that the Utah Supreme 
Court had not entered an order dismissing the Motion of 
Interlocutory Appeal, (R at 1902). The record does not show any 
return of jurisdiction to the trial court to set trial or act 
following the request for interlocutory appeal, (R at 1645)., 
Notwithstanding the lack of the return of jurisdiction to the 
trial court to act in this matter, both counsel for plaintiffs and 
defendants were under the impression that a trial date was to be 
set by the court for November 2, 1992, (R at 1737 and 1745). 
However, the court did not set trial for November 2, 1992 
notwithstanding the understanding of the parties on that point, (R 
at 1899). Regardless of the parties' understanding, however, the 
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fact that trial had not been set cannot be used against plaintiffs 
when both parties could have requested a trial setting from the 
court. See Crystal Lime & Cement Company v. Robbins. In fact, this 
factor, although determined to be of no importance by the trial 
court ought to support the position of appellants. The case with 
the closest resemblance to this is that of Maxfield v. Fishery, 538 
P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), wherein counsel for plaintiffs did 
absolutely nothing for two (2) years. Discovery was not responded 
to, bond had not been filed, and there was no pretense of 
preparation for trial. This is significantly different from the 
current case wherein discovery had been completed and the parties 
are ready for trial, (R at 1906-1907). 
(2) CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES. The court found with regard to 
conduct of the parties that plaintiffs were delaying the matter by 
replacement of counsel and refusal to prosecute the case whereas 
defendants had consistently and continuously moved the case forward 
by conducting discovery, narrowing of the scope of the case through 
pretrial motions and cooperating with opposing counsel and 
adherence to court cut-off dates and deadlines, (R at 1865). In 
making that finding, the trial court ignored the effect of the 
actions of defendants and the effect of orders of the court in 
preparing for trial. Defendant Brian was not deposed until November 
30, 1991, (R at 1225), although he was initially deposed October 
27, 1990, (R at 222). Defendant Brian refused to respond to Request 
for Production of Documents on meretricious grounds, as well as to 
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interrogatories, (see R at 530 and 555). The trial court had to 
compel defendant Brian to comply with discovery, (R at 859). 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior sought a protective order in this matter 
to prevent plaintiffs from learning that a policy of malpractice 
insurance in fact did exist contrary to their representations with 
regard to the same, (R at 1700). 
It is true that plaintiffs did request extensions of time to 
respond to discovery and to get counsel, (R at 79, 96, 139, 273, 
280, 300 and 307). The court ordered responses by plaintiffs and 
compelled them to respond also. (R at 859 at 863). However, the 
court's record demonstrates that plaintiff James A. Johnson made 
himself available for deposition despite his medical condition, 
with the trial by combat lasting over a three (3) day period in 
November of 1990, (R at 1177). This was over a year before 
Defendant Brian willingly submitted to deposition, (R at 1177). 
Following the April 16, 1991 appearance of Darwin Fisher in this 
matter, (R at 867), no continuance of the deposition of James A. 
Johnson was made at his request, (R at 98). 
(3) THE TRIAL COURT ITSELF CONTRIBUTED TO THE DELAY IN THIS 
MATTER. 
Trial was initially set for February 17-28, 1992, (R at 897). 
The court on January 17, 1992 granted defendant Brian leave to file 
a Counterclaim, (R at 1329). This Counterclaim was not filed until 
two weeks before the scheduled trial date on February 4, 1992, (R 
at 1484). The court granted permission to file a Counterclaim by 
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defendant Brian even through sixteen months had elapsed since the 
filing of the case and defendant Brian was well aware of all facts 
necessary for a Counterclaim and did not rely upon the completion 
of James Johnson's deposition which occurred November 22, 1991. 
Counterclaim was filed October 17, 1991, (R at 929). Defendant 
Brian has never explained his reasons for delaying sixteen months 
before filing a Counterclaim for which he had all facts, and at 
least no later than November 30, 1991 when the original three (3) 
day deposition of Mr. Johnson was terminated due to depression, (R 
at 1177). It was due to the filing and the acceptance of the 
counterclaim by the court that the February trial date was 
continued until May of 1992, (R at 1490). 
The court further modified the circumstances of this case by 
granting a summary judgment denying any and all damages for 
emotional distress suffered as a result of the tortious acts of 
defendants, (R at 1371). With the major element of damages in this 
matter dismissed by the court in its motion granting partial 
summary judgment, and because appeal would be taken in this matter 
regardless of the result in court, a request for interlocutory 
appeal was filed April 7, 1992, (R at 1645). The court then 
continued on its own motion the trial without date, (R at 1647). 
The purpose for the request for interlocutory order was 
specifically for judicial economy. Should the trial have occurred 
without emotional distress as an element of damage, and regardless 
of the outcome, an appeal would have been taken to this court to 
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determine whether or not plaintiffs were entitled to emotional 
distress damages in the circumstances. If the right to present 
evidence on emotional distress was found to be appropriate by this 
court, a second complete trial would have had to have been held. It 
made absolutely no sense to proceed further until an order was 
entered by the Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court either 
granting the interlocutory appeal or denying the same. As of April 
6, 1993, the date of the dismissal, no order with regard to the 
interlocutory appeal had been entered. The only purpose for the 
filing of the interlocutory appeal was to move this case forward 
and for judicial economy. The continuance from February to May was 
necessary because of defendant Brian's tardy counterclaim, which 
left plaintiffs with no time to prepare therefore. Plaintiffs 
actions were a direct result of rulings of the trial court based 
upon actions of defendants, and should not be charged to plaintiffs 
as improper. 
Despite the foregoing, the trial court has ignored all of the 
dilatory actions of defendants in this matter which are of record, 
and concentrated on plaintiffs* actions. It has chosen to consider 
in its findings of fact settlement negotiations which occurred 
prior to the filing of the action, as well prior changes of 
counsel. The court has made unsupported findings that the change of 
counsel acted to delay the prosecution of this case. Discovery 
proceeded without any hinderance following the appearance Conder & 
Wangsgard. Depositions were held in November of 1990, and the 
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record shows that Conder & Wangsgard actively prosecuted this case 
following its appearance in August of 1990, (R at 184, 187, 218, 
222, 224, 226, 288, (Answer to Interrogatories on November 19, 
1990) and 273). 
The court set a hearing for April 16, 1991, (R at 861), at 
which time Darwin Fisher appeared as new counsel, (R at 867). He 
then appeared at Settlement Conference schedule originally for June 
26, 1991, (R at 871, which was eventually held July 12, 1991, (R at 
887). Appellants fail to detect any indication from the record 
which shows that the case was not moved forward by their counsel. 
The only counsel which required time to become familiar with the 
case was current counsel, and that was due to the two (2) factors 
discussed hereinabove that the motion for interlocutory appeal had 
not been acted upon by the Utah Supreme Court and there was some 
confusion as to when Notice of Appearance was actually received and 
accepted by the trial court. In as much as Darwin Fisher continued 
to be counsel of record until January 15, 1993, it seems strange 
that two (2) weeks is considered sufficient time in a case of this 
magnitude to become fully conversant, see (R at 1785). 
Defendants have sought to delay and prevent plaintiffs from 
gaining information. They have required orders to compel responses 
to discovery and deny their protective orders, (R at 859 and 1700). 
Their experts have continuously not been available and required 
plaintiffs to extend time in order to depose them, (R at 1647, 1657 
and 1666). The court, for good cause, granted the extension to 
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depose this witness, and did not find that it was plaintiffs' lack 
of alacrity which was the reason therefore, (R at 1687). In as much 
as Mr. Johnson made himself available as much as possible in spite 
his condition for grueling trial by combat imposed upon him by 
defendants at the deposition held November 28-30, 1990, (R at 
1177), Defendant Brian did not seem to be available at any time 
until after the completion of Mr. Johnson's deposition (R at 1225 
and 1898), and the fact that both sides were attempting to deny 
information to the other, the court's findings that the conduct of 
the plaintiffs is entirely at fault for the delay herein is not 
supported. At best, the facts show that both parties acted in the 
same manner. Neither parties should therefore be punished. 
(4) ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES TO MOVE THE CASE FORWARD 
Although the court held that the defendants had narrowed the 
issues and sought to move the case forward in spite of plaintiffs 
dilatory tactics, the facts cited hereinabove simply do not support 
that. Appellants have combed the record for any indication that 
defendants have been golden haired children in this matter. Both 
parties have conducted discovery, and both parties have sought 
protection of the court with regard to certain matters. A 
reiteration of the facts as cited above should be unnecessary. The 
record does not support the findings of the trial court and this 
finding should therefore be set aside. 
(5) DIFFICULTY AND PREJUDICE OF THE PARTIES 
Contrary to the court's finding that defendants only narrowed 
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the scope of trial, the counterclaim filed by Defendant Brian in 
fact significantly expanded the scope of trial and required 
additional preparation and time by plaintiffs, R at 1329, 1474 and 
1490. The prejudice caused by the counterclaim cannot be 
underplayed. What is apparent is that the trial court is punishing 
plaintiffs for the trial courts own failure to set trial November 
2, 1992. It was the understanding of both parties that in fact such 
trial was to occur at that time, and when such trial was not set, 
counsel for plaintiffs at that time felt free to withdraw in as 
much as there would be no prejudice to any party. The court itself 
found that no prejudice was suffered thereby, (R at 1785). How the 
court could have decided between January 15, 1993 and February 4, 
1993 that prejudice had suddenly happened due to change of counsel 
is beyond the comprehension of this counsel. 
(6) INJUSTICE WHICH MAY RESULT FROM DISMISSAL 
The court found that no injustice will result from dismissal, 
determining that no damages could have resulted which would be 
significant. The trial court was unfamiliar with current litigation 
costs which can rapidly accrue fees of astronomical proportions 
literally overnight. This was an element of damages. The court's 
finding was contrary to the evidence presented before it in the 
original Complaint, (R at 1-12) which in fact alleged significant 
damages. If this court determines that emotional distress is a 
valid damage for recovery in this type or action, there is no doubt 
that the emotional distress damages dues to Post-traumatic Stress 
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Disorder suffered by Plaintiffs will be of an extremely significant 
nature, (R at 1177J. Mr. Johnson lost his business and was 
significantly impaired emotionally as a direct result of these 
acts. This is a significant question of fact as to the exact amount 
of that damage, and an out of hand dismissal that such damages 
cannot be great is a direct violation of Section 11, Article I of 
the Utah Constitution. 
(7) WESTINGHOUSE WAS NOT SATISFIED BY THE DISMISSAL IN THIS 
ACTION 
Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the record as a 
whole demonstrates that plaintiffs were at least as culpable as 
plaintiffs for the time lost prior to the filing of their motion 
for dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute in February 
of 1993. Neither side has acted as angels in this matter, but the 
time which has elapsed is so small, and the confusion which was 
caused both by the actions of defendants, the trial court, and the 
Utah Supreme Court (by failing to file an order denying motion for 
interlocutory appeal) significantly outweigh any prejudice caused 
by plaintiffs failure to request trial setting. Dismissal was 
therefore an abuse of discretion. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO DISMISS THIS 
ACTION 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Interlocutory Order regarding 
the emotional distress damage question on April 7, 1992, (R at 
1645). The Utah Supreme Court did not act on the interlocutory 
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request prior to the motion to dismiss, April 6, 1993 (R at 1798). 
A substantial question of jurisdiction exists in this case in as 
much as grant of the interlocutory order would cause all of the 
time periods which apply to appeals from final orders to apply to 
this action. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 5(e) states "if the 
petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have been 
docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceeding 
subsequent to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within 
the time required, for appeals from final judgments". In as much as 
the court had not entered an order in this matter either granting 
the interlocutory request or denying the same, the question was 
before the Utah Supreme Court, and the case was subject to action 
thereby. 
The Supreme Court is a superior court to the district court. 
Utah Constitution Article VIII Sections 2 and 3. It has 
jurisdiction over cases before it. The reason this divested in the 
trial court of authority to act is that if the Supreme Court 
granted the interlocutory request following the dismissal it would 
proffering an advisory opinion, and the trial court having the 
jurisdiction to dismiss the case would have the effect of giving 
the district court the power to control the docket of the Utah 
Supreme Court, and divest it of jurisdiction to review an order 
which was properly before it. In as much as the Utah Supreme Court 
had entered no order on the request for interlocutory order, the 
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district court could not have had jurisdiction, and therefore 
dismissal was void. 
E. DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE PROPER IN THIS MATTER 
It is a question of fact what has caused the Post-traumatic 
Stress Disorder suffered by plaintiffs. An expert has diagnosed it 
as attributable to the adoption malpractice, (R at 1177). The trial 
court, however, as a matter of law determined that such damages are 
not assessable to defendants in Utah, (R at 1371). This is 
expressly contrary to the Utah Supreme Court findings in Samms v. 
Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 358 P. 2d 344 (1961). In that case, the defendant 
phoned and visited plaintiff on numerous occasions seeking intimate 
relations with her. Plaintiff alleged that this caused her deep 
emotional distress. The Utah Supreme Court agreed finding that: 
[T]he best considered view recognizes an action for 
severe emotional distress, though not accompanied by 
bodily impact or physical injury, where the defendant 
intentionally engaged in some conduct where plaintiff, 
(a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or 
(b) where any reasonable person would have known that 
such would result; and his actions are of such a nature 
to be considered outrageous and intolerable and that they 
offend against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. Samms, 358 P.2d at 346-347 
Without bodily injury Mr. and Mrs. Johnson have suffered acute 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, (R at 1177). In the opinion of 
their treating physician, this was directly attributable to the 
adoption. In the mess created by Defendant Brian, now a sitting 
judge with a reputation for strict application of the law, 
defendant Brian did not comply with even one requirement of the 
Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children. Although he was 
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an experience adoption attorney, he simply went to Texas, picked 
the baby up from the mother after she had left the hospital, took 
the baby on the plane to Salt Lake City, and then handed the baby 
to plaintiffs, (R at 1-12). There is a significant disagreement as 
to what he told them at the airport, but it would seem even to a 
lay person that an attorney should comply with statutes of which he 
is aware, especially when we are dealing with rights as important 
as those of parents and the adoption process. It is a question of 
fact as to what Defendant Brian should have done in Texas and what 
was possible to have been done in Texas prior to his returning with 
the child. It is for this purpose that experts exist. It is not the 
purpose of plaintiffs to argue that they are entitled to summary 
judgment before this court with regard to the outrageous actions of 
Defendant Brian, but if he did as alleged, and he has presented no 
evidence in the record, in deposition, through interrogatories, or 
through request for production of documents, which indicates that 
he did anything to comply with the statutes, this would seem to be 
a very good example of "outrageous and intolerable conduct" which 
,foffend[s] against the generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality". 
Plaintiffs have alleged an extremely grievous breach of 
professional ethics by defendant Brian. If in fact he failed to 
turn in a professional performance in this matter, then at the very 
least he is in breach of conduct and has committed malpractice. 
Because of the universally recognized existence and character of 
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the family bond, and the love which both adoptive and natural 
parents hold for their children, it is beyond the comprehension of 
plaintiffs that he would not know that malpractice in this case 
would be outrageous. If he simply did not care, it would be 
reckless indifference to the effect of his actions, or imputable 
intent. On this point, expert testimony is appropriate and the 
summary judgment on this matter should be set aside in as much as 
a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
A genuine issue of material fact exists in this matter and 
summary judgment was therefore improper. With regard to the trial 
court's conclusion of law, no particular deference may be granted 
to it and as such should be reviewed for correctness. Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). The trial court's grant 
of summary judgment denying a right of recovery for emotional 
distress damages in this matter is clearly contrary to Samms v. 
Eccles, the trial court's conclusion of law deserves no particular 
deference, and as such must be set aside. Plaintiffs are entitled 
to recovery for emotional distress damages suffered in this matter. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted in haste when it dismissed for failure 
to prosecute, and its findings are not based upon the record as a 
whole. Its findings of fact and judgment of dismissal should 
therefore be set aside. 
In addition to the above, the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to dismiss in as much as the Utah Supreme Court had 
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jurisdiction this case at the time of dismissal. Judgment of 
dismissal was therefore moot and without effect. 
Finally, partial summary judgment on the issue of emotional 
distress was improper in as much as a genuine issue of material 
fact exists regarding the outrageous conduct of Defendant Brian and 
the intent in this matter. Dismissal of emotional distress damages 
was therefore contrary to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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